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Abstract
In this paper, a game-theoretic model for studying power control for wireless data networks in
frequency-selective multipath environments is analyzed. The uplink of an impulse-radio ultrawideband
system is considered. The effects of self-interference and multiple-access interference on the performance
of generic Rake receivers are investigated for synchronous systems. Focusing on energy efficiency, a
noncooperative game is proposed in which users in the network are allowed to choose their transmit
powers to maximize their own utilities, and the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game is derived.
It is shown that, due to the frequency selective multipath, the noncooperative solution is achieved at
different signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios, depending on the channel realization and the type of
Rake receiver employed. A large-system analysis is performed to derive explicit expressions for the
achieved utilities. The Pareto-optimal (cooperative) solution is also discussed and compared with the
noncooperative approach.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
As the demand for wireless services increases, the need for efficient resource allocation and interference
mitigation in wireless data networks becomes more and more crucial. A fundamental goal of radio resource
management is transmitter power control, which aims to allow each user to achieve the required quality
of service (QoS) at the uplink receiver without causing unnecessary interference to other users in the
system. Another key issue in wireless system design is energy consumption at user terminals, since, in
many scenarios, the terminals are battery-powered.
Recently, game theory has been used as an effective tool to study noncooperative power control in data
networks [1]–[8]. The advantages of noncooperative (distributed) approaches with respect to a cooperative
(centralized) approach are mainly due to the scalability of the network. Many of the problems to be solved
in a communications system are in fact known to be NP-hard. As a consequence, real-time solution of
these optimization problems in a centralized fashion becomes infeasible as the network size increases
and as the number of users varies [1]. Game theory is the natural framework for modeling and studying
these kinds of interactions. A model for power control as a noncooperative game is proposed in [2]. In
this scenario, the users choose their transmit powers to maximize their utilities, defined as the ratio of
throughput to transmit power. In [3], a network-assisted power-control scheme is proposed to improve
the overall utility of a direct-sequence code-division multiple access (DS-CDMA) system. In [4], [5], the
authors use pricing to obtain a more efficient solution for the power control game. Joint network-centric
and user-centric power control are discussed in [6]. In [7], the authors propose a power control game for
multicarrier CDMA (MC-CDMA) systems, while in [8] the effects of the receiver have been considered,
particularly extending the study to multiuser detectors and multiantenna receivers.
This work considers power control in ultrawideband (UWB) systems. UWB technology is considered
to be a potential candidate for next-generation short-range high-speed data transmission, due to its
large spreading factor (which implies large multiuser capacity) and low power spectral density (which
allows coexistence with incumbent systems in the same frequency bands). Commonly, impulse-radio (IR)
systems, which transmit very short pulses with a low duty cycle, are employed to implement UWB systems
[9], [10]. In an IR system, a train of pulses is sent and the information is usually conveyed by the position
or the polarity of the pulses, which correspond to pulse position modulation (PPM) and binary phase
shift keying (BPSK), respectively. To prevent catastrophic collisions among different users and, thus, to
provide robustness against multiple access interference (MAI), each information symbol is represented
by a sequence of pulses; the positions of the pulses within that sequence are determined by a pseudo-
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3random time-hopping (TH) sequence that is specific to each user [10]. In “classical” impulse radio, the
polarity of those pulses representing an information symbol is always the same, whether PPM or BPSK
is employed [10], [11]. Recently, pulse-based polarity randomization was proposed [12], where each
pulse has a random polarity code in addition to the modulation scheme, providing additional robustness
against MAI [13] and helping to optimize the spectral shape according to US Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) specifications [14]. Due to the large bandwidth, UWB signals have a much higher
temporal resolution than conventional narrowband or wideband signals. Hence, channel fading cannot
be assumed to be flat [15], and self-interference (SI) must be taken into account [16]. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the problem of radio resource allocation in a frequency-
selective multipath environment using a game-theoretic approach. Previous work in this area has assumed
flat fading [17]–[19].
Our focus throughout this work is on energy efficiency. In this kind of applications it is often more
important to maximize the number of bits transmitted per Joule of energy consumed than to maximize
throughput. We first propose a noncooperative (distributed) game in which users are allowed to choose
their transmit powers according to a utility-maximization criterion. Focusing on Rake receivers [20]
at the base station, we derive the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game, also proving its existence
and uniqueness. Using a large-system analysis, we obtain an approximation of the interference which is
suitable for any kind of fading channels, including both small- and large-scale statistics. We also compute
explicit expressions for the utility achieved at the equilibrium in a particular scenario and compare the
performance of our noncooperative approach with the optimal cooperative (centralized) solution. It is
shown that the difference between these two approaches is not significant for typical networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Some background for this work is given in
Sect. II. In Sect. III, we describe our power control game and analyze the Nash equilibrium for this
game. In Sect. IV, we use the game-theoretic framework along with a large-system analysis to evaluate
the performance of the system in terms of transmit powers and achieved utilities. The Pareto-optimal
(cooperative) solution to the power control game is discussed in Sect. V, and its performance is compared
with that of the noncooperative approach. Numerical results are discussed in Sect. VI, where also an
iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching the Nash equilibrium is presented. Some conclusions are
drawn in Sect. VII.
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4II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Formulation
Consider the uplink of an IR-UWB data network, where every user wishes to locally and selfishly
choose its action to maximize its own utility function. The strategy chosen by a user affects the perfor-
mance of the other users in the network through MAI. Furthermore, since a realistic IR-UWB transmission
takes place in frequency-selective multipath channels, the effect of SI cannot be neglected.
To pose the power control problem as a noncooperative game, a suitable definition of a utility function
is needed to measure energy efficiency for wireless data applications. A tradeoff relationship exists
between obtaining high signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) levels and consuming low energy.
These issues can be quantified [2] by defining the utility function of the kth user to be the ratio of its
throughput Tk to its transmit power pk, i.e.
uk(p) =
Tk
pk
, (1)
where p = [p1, . . . , pK ] is the vector of transmit powers, with K denoting the number of users in the
network. Throughput, here referred to as the net number of information bits that are received without
error per unit time, can be expressed as
Tk =
D
M
Rkfs(γk), (2)
where D and M are the number of information bits and the total number of bits in a packet, respectively;
Rk and γk are the transmission rate and the SINR for the kth user, respectively; and fs(γk) is the efficiency
function representing the packet success rate (PSR), i.e., the probability that a packet is received without
an error. Our assumption is that a packet will be retransmitted if it has one or more bit errors. The
PSR depends on the details of the data transmission, including its modulation, coding, and packet size.
To prevent the mathematical anomalies described in [2], we replace PSR with an efficiency function
f(γk) when calculating the throughput for our utility function. In the case of BPSK TH-IR systems in
multipath fading channels, a reasonable approximation to the PSR for moderate-to-large values of M is
f(γk) = (1− e
−γk/2)M .
However, our analysis throughout this paper is valid for any efficiency function that is increasing, S-
shaped,1 and continuously differentiable, with f(0) = 0, f(+∞) = 1, and f ′(0) = df(γk)/dγk|γk=0 = 0.
1An increasing function is S-shaped if there is a point above which the function is concave, and below which the function is
convex.
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5Fig. 1. User’s utility as a function of transmit power for fixed interference.
These assumptions are valid in many practical systems. Furthermore, we assume that all users have the
same efficiency function. Generalization to the case where the efficiency function is dependent on k is
straightforward. Note that the throughput Tk in (2) could also be replaced with the Shannon capacity
formula if uk(p) in (1) is appropriately modified to ensure uk(p) = 0 when pk = 0.
Combining (1) and (2), and replacing the PSR with f(γk),
uk(p) =
D
M
Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (3)
This utility function, which has units of bits/Joule, represents the total number of data bits that are
delivered to the destination without an error per Joule of energy consumed, capturing the tradeoff between
throughput and battery life. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the transmission rate is the same
for all users, i.e., R1 = · · · = RK = R. All the results obtained here can easily be generalized to the
case of unequal rates. Fig. 1 shows the shape of the utility function in (3) as a function of transmit power
keeping other users’ transmit power fixed (the meaning of p∗ and u∗ will be provided in the remainder
of the paper).
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6B. System Model
We consider a BPSK random TH-IR system2 with K users in the network transmitting to a receiver
at a common concentration point. The processing gain of the system is assumed to be N = Nf · Nc,
where Nf is the number of pulses that represent one information symbol, and Nc denotes the number
of possible pulse positions in a frame [9]. The transmission is assumed to be over frequency selective
channels, with the channel for user k modeled as a tapped delay line:
ck(t) =
L∑
l=1
α
(k)
l δ(t− (l − 1)Tc − τk), (4)
where Tc is the duration of the transmitted UWB pulse, which is the minimum resolvable path interval;
L is the number of channel paths; αk = [α(k)1 , . . . , α
(k)
L ]
T and τk are the fading coefficients and the
delay of user k, respectively. Considering a chip-synchronous scenario, the symbols are misaligned by
an integer multiple of the chip interval Tc: τk = ∆kTc, for every k, where ∆k is uniformly distributed
in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. In addition we assume that the channel characteristics remain unchanged over a
number of symbol intervals [16].
Especially in indoor environments, multipath channels can have hundreds of multipath components
due to the high resolution of UWB signals. In such cases, linear receivers such as matched filters (MFs),
pulse-discarding receivers [21], and multiuser detectors (MUDs) [22] cannot provide good performance,
since more collisions will occur through multipath components. In order to mitigate the effect of multipath
fading as much as possible, we consider a base station where K Rake receivers [20] are used.3 The Rake
receiver for user k is composed of L fingers, where the vector βk = G ·αk = [β
(k)
1 , . . . , β
(k)
L ]
T represents
the combining weights for user k, and the L×L matrix G depends on the type of Rake receiver employed.
In particular, if G = I, an all-Rake (ARake) receiver is considered.
The SINR of the kth user at the output of the Rake receiver can be well approximated4 by [16]
γk =
h
(SP)
k pk
h
(SI)
k pk +
K∑
j=1
j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj pj + σ
2
, (5)
where σ2 is the variance of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receiver, and the gains are
2Throughout all the paper, we consider IR-UWB systems with polarity code randomization [12].
3For ease of calculation, perfect channel estimation is considered throughout the paper.
4This approximation is valid for large Nf (typically, at least 5).
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7expressed by
h
(SP)
k = β
H
k ·αk, (6)
h
(SI)
k =
1
N
∣∣∣∣Φ · (BHk ·αk +AHk · βk)∣∣∣∣2
βHk · αk
, (7)
h
(MAI)
kj =
1
N
∣∣∣∣BHk ·αj∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣AHj · βk∣∣∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣βHk · αj∣∣2
βHk ·αk
, (8)
where the matrices
Ak =


α
(k)
L · · · · · · α
(k)
2
0 α
(k)
L · · · α
(k)
3
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 · · · 0 α
(k)
L
0 · · · · · · 0


, (9)
Bk =


β
(k)
L · · · · · · β
(k)
2
0 β
(k)
L · · · β
(k)
3
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 · · · 0 β
(k)
L
0 · · · · · · 0


, (10)
Φ = diag {φ1, . . . , φL−1} , φl =
√
min{L−l,Nc}
Nc
, (11)
have been introduced for convenience of notation.
By considering frequency selective channels, the transmit power of the kth user, pk, does appear not
only in the numerator of (5), but also in the denominator, owing to the SI due to multiple paths. In the
following sections, we extend the approach of game theory to multipath channels, accounting for the SI
in addition to MAI and AWGN. The problem is more challenging than with a single path since every
user achieves a different SINR at the output of its Rake receiver.
III. THE NONCOOPERATIVE POWER CONTROL GAME
In this section, we propose a noncooperative power control game (NPCG) in which every user seeks
to maximize its own utility by choosing its transmit power. Let G = [K, {Pk}, {uk(p)}] be the proposed
noncooperative game where K = {1, . . . ,K} is the index set for the terminal users; Pk =
[
p
k
, pk
]
is
the strategy set, with p
k
and pk denoting minimum and maximum power constraints, respectively; and
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8uk(p) is the payoff function for user k [5]. Throughout this paper, we assume pk = 0 and pk = p > 0
for all k ∈ K.
Formally, the NPCG can be expressed as
max
pk∈Pk
uk(p) = max
pk∈Pk
uk(pk,p−k) for k = 1, . . . ,K, (12)
where p−k denotes the vector of transmit powers of all terminals except terminal k. The latter notation is
used to emphasize that the kth user has control over its own power pk only. Assuming equal transmission
rate for all users, (12) can be rewritten as
max
pk∈Pk
f(γk(pk,p−k))
pk
for k = 1, . . . ,K, (13)
where we have explicitly shown that γk is a function of p, as expressed in (5).
The solution that is most widely used for noncooperative game theoretic problems is the Nash equi-
librium [1]. A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies such that no user can unilaterally improve its own
utility. Formally, a power vector p = [p1, . . . , pK ] is a Nash equilibrium of G = [K, {Pk}, {uk(p)}] if,
for every k ∈ K, uk(pk,p−k) ≥ uk(p′k,p−k) for all p′k ∈ Pk.
The Nash equilibrium concept offers a predictable, stable outcome of a game where multiple agents
with conflicting interests compete through self-optimization and reach a point where no player wishes
to deviate. However, such a point does not necessary exist. First, we investigate the existence of an
equilibrium in the NPCG.
Theorem 1: A Nash equilibrium exists in the NPCG G = [K, {Pk}, {uk(p)}]. Furthermore, the
unconstrained maximization of the utility function occurs when each user k achieves an SINR γ∗k that is
a solution of
f ′(γ∗k)γ
∗
k (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k) = f(γ
∗
k), (14)
where
γ0,k =
h
(SP)
k
h
(SI)
k
= N ·
(βHk ·αk)
2∣∣∣∣Φ · (BHk · αk +AHk · βk)∣∣∣∣2 ≥ 1 (15)
and f ′(γ∗k) = df(γk)/dγk|γk=γ∗k .
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in App. I-A.
The Nash equilibrium can be seen from another point of view. The power level chosen by a rational
self-optimizing user constitutes a best response to the powers chosen by other players. Formally, terminal
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9k’s best response rk : P−k → Pk is the correspondence that assigns to each p−k ∈ P−k the set
rk(p−k) = {pk ∈ Pk : uk(pk,p−k) ≥ uk(p′k,p−k)}
for all p′k ∈ Pk, (16)
where P−k is the strategy space of all users excluding user k.
With the notion of a terminal’s best response correspondence, the Nash equilibrium can be restated in
a compact form: the power vector p is a Nash equilibrium of the NPCG G = [K, {Pk}, {uk(p)}] if and
only if pk ∈ rk(p−k) for all k ∈ K.
Prop. 1: Using the above definition in the NPCG, with a slight abuse of notation, terminal k’s best
response to a given interference vector p−k is [5]
rk(p−k) = min(p, p∗k), (17)
where
p∗k = arg max
pk∈R+
uk(pk,p−k)
=
γ∗k
(∑
j 6=k h
(MAI)
kj pj + σ
2
)
h
(SP)
k
(
1− γ∗k/γ0,k
) (18)
is the unconstrained maximizer of the utility in (3) (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, p∗k is unique. The proof of
Prop. 1 can be found in App. I-B.
It is worth noting that, at any equilibrium of the NPCG, a terminal either attains the utility maximizing
SINR γ∗k or it fails to do so and transmits at maximum power p.
Theorem 2: The NPCG has a unique Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in App. I-C.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In the previous section, we have proven that a Nash equilibrium for the NPCG exists and is unique.
In the following, we study the properties of this equilibrium. It is worth emphasizing that, unlike the
previous work in this area, γ∗k is dependent on k, because of the SI in (5). Hence, each user attains
a different level of SINR. More importantly, the only term dependent on k in (14) is γ0,k, which is
affected only by the channel of user k. This means that γ∗k can be assumed constant when the channel
characteristics remain unchanged, irrespectively of the transmit powers p and the channel coefficients of
the other users. For convenience of notation, we can express γ∗k as a function of γ0,k:
γ∗k = Γ (γ0,k) . (19)
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Fig. 2. Shape of γ∗k as a function of γ0,k (M = 100).
Fig. 2 shows the shape of γ∗k as a function of γ0,k, where the efficiency function is taken as f(γk) =
(1− e−γk/2)M , with M = 100. Even though γ∗k is shown for values of γ0,k approaching 0 dB, it is worth
emphasizing that γ0,k > 10 dB in most practical situations.
As can be noticed, the NPCG proposed herein represents a generalization of the power control games
discussed thoroughly in literature [2]–[8]. If L = 1, i.e. in a flat-fading scenario, we obtain from (7) and
(15) that γ0,k =∞ for all k. This implies that γ∗k is the same for every k ∈ K, and thus it is possible to
apply the approach proposed, e.g., in [5].
Assumption 1: To simplify the analysis, let us assume the typical case of multiuser UWB systems,
where N ≫ K. In addition, p is considered sufficiently large that pk < p for those users who achieve
γ∗k . In particular, when N ≫ K, at the Nash equilibrium the following property holds:
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k ≃ q > 0 ∀k ∈ K. (20)
The heuristic derivation of (20) can be justified by SI reduction due to the hypothesis N ≫ K > 1.
Using (7), γ0,k ≫ 1 for all k. Hence, the noncooperative solution will be similar to that studied, e.g., in
[8]. The validity of this assumption will be shown in Sect. VI through simulations.
The following proposition helps identify the Nash equilibrium for a given set of channel realizations.
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Prop. 2: A necessary and sufficient condition for a desired SINR γ∗k to be achievable is
γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)
< 1 ∀k ∈ K, (21)
where γ0,k is defined as in (15), and
ζ−1k =
K∑
j=1
j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj
h
(SP)
j
. (22)
When (21) holds, each user can reach the optimum SINR, and the minimum power solution to do so is
to assign each user k a transmit power
p∗k =
1
h
(SP)
k
·
σ2γ∗k
1− γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
) . (23)
When (21) does not hold, the users cannot achieve γ∗k simultaneously, and some of them would end up
transmitting at the maximum power p. The proof of Prop. 2 can be found in App. I-D.
Based on Prop. 2, the amount of transmit power p∗k required to achieve the target SINR γ∗k will depend
not only on the gain h(SP)k , but also on the SI term h
(SI)
k (through γ0,k) and the interferers h(MAI)kj (through
ζk). In order to derive some quantitative results for the utility function and for the transmit powers
independent of SI and MAI terms, it is possible to resort to a large systems analysis. For convenience of
notation, we introduce the following definitions, with Var[·] denoting the variance of a random variable:
• let Dαj be a diagonal matrix whose elements are
{Dαj }l =
√
Var[α
(l)
j ]; (24)
• let Dβk be a diagonal matrix whose elements are
{Dβk}l =
√
Var[β
(l)
k ]; (25)
• let Cαj be an L× (L− 1) matrix whose elements are
{Cαj }li =
√
Var[{Aj}li]
L
; (26)
• let Cβj be an L× (L− 1) matrix whose elements are
{Cβk}li =
√
Var[{Bk}li]
L
; (27)
• let ϕ (·) be the matrix operator
ϕ (·) = lim
L→∞
1
L
Tr(·), (28)
where Tr(·) is the trace operator.
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Theorem 3: Assume that α(l)k are zero-mean random variables independent across k and l, and G is
a deterministic diagonal matrix (thus implying that α(l)k and β
(m)
j are dependent only when j = k and
m = l). In the asymptotic case where K and Nf are finite,5 while L,Nc →∞, the term ζ−1k converges
almost surely (a.s.) to
ζ−1k
a.s.
→
1
N
K∑
j=1
j 6=k
ϕ
(
DαjC
β
kC
β
k
H
Dαj
)
+ ϕ
(
D
β
kC
α
jC
α
j
HD
β
k
)
ϕ
(
DαjD
β
j
)
· ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
) . (29)
Theorem 4: Assume α(l)k and G as in Theorem 3. In the asymptotic case where K and Nf are finite,
while L,Nc →∞,
γ−10,k
a.s.
→
1
N
lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i)
(
ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
))2 , (30)
where φi is defined as in (11) and
θk (l, L+ l − i) = {D
α
k}l{D
β
k}L+l−i
+ {Dβk}l{D
α
k}L+l−i. (31)
The proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 can be found in App. II.
It is worth emphasize that the results above can be applied to any kind of fading models, since only
the second-order statistics are required. Furthermore, due to the symmetry of (29) and (30), it is easy to
verify that the results are independent of large-scale fading models. Hence, Theorems 3 and 4 apply to
any kind of channel, which may include both large- and small-scale statistics.
For ease of calculation, in the following we derive the asymptotic values when considering a flat
Power Delay Profile (PDP) [23] for the channel coefficients. In addition, the variance of α(l)k is assumed
dependent on the user k, but independent of l, i.e., Var[α(l)k ] = σ2k for all l.
Prop. 3: Under the above mentioned hypotheses, when using an ARake, and thus G = I,
ζ−1k
a.s.
→
K − 1
N
, (32)
γ−10,k
a.s.
→
ν (ρ)
N
, (33)
5In order for the analysis to be consistent, and also considering regulations by the FCC [14], it is worth noting that Nf could
not be smaller than a certain threshold (Nf ≥ 5).
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where ρ = Nc/L, 0 < ρ <∞, and
ν (ρ) =


2
3
(
3− 3ρ+ ρ2
)
, ρ ≤ 1,
2/(3ρ), ρ > 1.
(34)
Using definitions (11) and (24) – (28), and applying Theorems 3 and 4, after some algebraic manipulations,
the proof is straightforward. As already noticed to justify Ass. 1, but also from (33), γ0,k ≫ 1 for all k.
Thus, γ∗k = Γ (γ0,k) approaches γ∗ = Γ (∞), leading to a nearly SINR-balancing scenario.
An immediate consequence of Prop. 3 is the expression for transmit powers and utility functions at
the Nash equilibrium, which are independent of the channel realizations of the other users, and of the
SI:6
p∗k ≃
1
h
(SP)
k
·
σ2γ∗
1− γ∗ · [K − 1 + ν (ρ)]/N
, (35)
u∗k ≃ h
(SP)
k ·
D
M
Rk
f(γ∗) (1− γ∗ · [K − 1 + ν (ρ)]/N)
σ2γ∗
, (36)
where u∗k is the utility function of the user k at the Nash equilibrium (see Fig. 1), and where the condition
(21) translates into
Nf ≥
⌈
γ∗ ·
K − 1 + ν (ρ)
Nc
⌉
. (37)
The validity of the claims above is verified in Sect. VI using simulations. To show that the results (32)
– (33) represent good approximations not only for the model with flat PDP and equal variances, which
has been used only for convenience of calculation, simulations are carried out using the exponential
decaying PDP described in [24], which provides a more realistic channel model for the UWB scenario.
V. SOCIAL OPTIMUM
The solution to the power control game is said to be Pareto-optimal if there exists no other power
allocation p for which one or more users can improve their utilities without reducing the utility of any
of the other users. It can be shown that the Nash equilibrium presented in the previous section is not
Pareto-optimal. This means that it is possible to improve the utility of one or more users without harming
other users. On the other hand, it can be shown that the solution to the following social problem gives
the Pareto-optimal frontier [8]:
popt = arg max
p
K∑
k=1
ξkuk(p), (38)
6Of course, the amount of transmit power p∗k needed to achieve γ∗k is dependent on the channel realization.
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for ξk ∈ R+ (the set of positive real numbers). Pareto-optimal solutions are, in general, difficult to obtain.
Here, we conjecture that the Pareto-optimal solution occurs when all users achieve the same SINRs, γopt.
This approach is chosen not only because SINR balancing ensures fairness among users in terms of
throughput and delay [8], but also because, for large systems, the Nash equilibrium is achieved when all
SINRs are similar. We also consider the hypothesis ξ1 = · · · = ξK = 1, suitable for a scenario without
priority classes. Hence, the maximization (38) can be written as
popt = arg max
p
f(γ)
K∑
k=1
1
pk
. (39)
In a network where the hypotheses of Ass. 1, Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 are fulfilled, and where
ARake receivers are employed, at the Nash equilibrium all users achieve a certain output SINR γ with
h
(SP)
k pk ≃ q (γ), where
q (γ) =
σ2γ
1− γ · [K − 1 + ν (ρ)]/N
, (40)
with ρ = Nc/L. Therefore, (39) can be expressed as
γopt ≃ arg max
γ
f(γ)
q (γ)
K∑
k=1
h
(SP)
k , (41)
since there exists a one-to-one correspondence between γ and p. It should be noted that, while the
maximizations in (13) consider no cooperation among users, (39) assumes that users cooperate in choosing
their transmit powers. That means that the relationship between the user’s SINR and transmit power will
be different from that in the noncooperative case.
Prop. 4: In a network where L,Nc →∞ and N ≫ K, using ARake receivers, the Nash equilibrium
approaches the Pareto-optimal solution.
Proof: The solution γopt to (41) must satisfy the condition d (f(γ)/q (γ)) /dγ|γ=γopt = 0. Using this
fact, combined with (40), gives us the equation that must be satisfied by the solution of the maximization
problem in (41):
f ′(γopt)γopt
[
1− γopt ·
K − 1 + ν (ρ)
N
]
= f(γopt). (42)
We see from (42) that the Pareto-optimal solution differs from the solution (14) of the noncooperative
utility-maximizing method, since (42) also takes into account the contribution of the interferers. In
particular,
γopt = Γ
(
K − 1 + ν (ρ)
N
)
. (43)
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Since the function Γ (·) is increasing with its argument for any S-shaped f(γ) (as can also be seen in
Fig. 2), and since N/ [(K − 1 + ν (ρ))] ≤ γ0,k for all k (from (32) and (33)),
γopt ≤ γ ≤ γ
∗, (44)
due to (19) and (43). On the other hand, assuming N ≫ K and 0 < ρ < ∞ implies γopt → γ∗. From
(44), it is apparent that γ → γ∗ as well. This means that, in almost all typical scenarios, the target
SINR for the noncooperative game, γ, is close to the target SINR for the Pareto-optimal solution, γopt.
Consequently, the average utility provided by the Nash equilibrium is close to the one achieved according
to the Pareto-optimal solution.
The validity of the above claims will be verified in Sect. VI using simulations.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Implementation
In this subsection, we present an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching a Nash equilibrium
of the proposed power control game. This algorithm is applicable to all types of Rake receivers, as well
as to any kind of channel model. The description of the algorithm is as follows.
The Best-Response Power-Control (BRPC) Algorithm
Consider a network with K users, a processing gain N = Nf · Nc, a channel with L fading paths,
and a maximum transmit power p.
1) Simulate the channel fading coefficients αk for all users according to the chosen channel model.
2) Set the Rake receivers coefficients βk for all users according to the chosen receiver.
3) Compute the SP term, h(SP)k , the SI term, h(SI)k , the MAI term, h(MAI)kj , according to (6) – (8), and
the optimum SINR, γ∗k , solution of (14), for all users.
4) Initialize randomly the transmit powers of all users within the range [0, p].
5) Compute the received SINR γk at the base station for each user according to (5).
6) Set k = 1.
7) Adjust the transmit power for user k according to (17) and to
p∗k = pk ·
γ∗k
γk
·
1− γk/γ0,k
1− γ∗k/γ0,k
, (45)
where γ0,k is defined as in (15).
September 6, 2018 DRAFT
16
8) k = k + 1.
9) If k ≤ K, then go back to Step 7.
10) Stop if the powers have converged; otherwise, go to Step 5.
This is a best-response algorithm, since at each stage a user decides to transmit at a power that
maximizes its own utility (i.e., its best-response strategy), given the current conditions of the system.
Looking at Step 7, it may appear from (18) that the each user should know its own transmit power pk
and ratio γ0,k, as well as some other quantities (pj and h(MAI)kj for j 6= k) relevant to all of the other users
in the network. On the contrary, it turns out that user k only needs to know its own received SINR at
the base station γk. In fact, the term due to interference-plus-noise in (18) can be obtained from (5) as∑
j 6=k
h
(MAI)
kj pj + σ
2 = h
(SP)
k pk ·
1− γk/γ0,k
γk
, (46)
where pk is the transmit power of user k at the previous iteration. Therefore, after straightforward
manipulation, (18) translates into the noncooperative update (45). The received SINR γk can be fed back
to the user terminal from the access point, along with SP and SI terms.
It is clear that the above algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium, whose existence and uniqueness
are proven in App. I. The convergence of the BRPC algorithm is also validated in Sect. VI-B using
extensive simulations.
B. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present numerical results for the analysis presented in the previous sections.
We assume that each packet contains 100 b of information and no overhead (i.e., D = M = 100). The
transmission rate is R = 100 kb/s, the thermal noise power is σ2 = 5 × 10−16 W, and the maximum
transmit power is p = 1µW. We use the efficiency function f(γk) = (1 − e−γk/2)M . Using M = 100,
γ∗ = Γ (∞) = 11.1 dB. To model the UWB scenario [15], channel gains are simulated following [24],
where both small- and large-scale statistics are taken into account. The distance between the users and
the base station is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 3 and 20m.
Before showing the numerical results for both the noncooperative and the cooperative approaches,
some simulations are provided to verify the validity of Ass. 1 introduced in Sect. IV. Table I reports
the ratio σ2q/η2q of the variance σ2q to the squared mean value η2q of the values q = h
(SP)
k p
∗
k, obtained
averaging 10 000 realizations of channel coefficients for different values of network parameters using
ARake receivers. We can see that, when the processing gain is much greater than the number of users,
σ2q/η
2
q ≪ 1. Hence, (20) can be used to carry out the theoretical analysis of the Nash equilibrium.
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TABLE I
RATIO σ2q/η2q FOR DIFFERENT NETWORK PARAMETERS.
(L,K)
(Nc, Nf ) (20,8) (20,16) (50,8) (50,16)
(30,10) 9.4E-4 3.2E-3 4.8E-4 1.7E-3
(30,50) 2.9E-5 6.4E-5 1.6E-5 3.4E-5
(50,10) 2.9E-4 6.8E-4 1.5E-4 3.7E-4
(50,50) 1.0E-5 2.2E-5 0.6E-5 1.2E-5
(100,10) 6.7E-5 1.5E-4 3.7E-5 7.8E-5
(100,50) 0.3E-5 0.6E-5 0.1E-5 0.3E-5
Fig. 3 shows the utilities achieved at the Nash equilibrium as functions of the channel gains hk =
||αk||
2
. These results have been obtained using random channel realizations for K = 16 users. The
number of possible pulse positions is Nc = 100, while the number of paths is L = 60, in order to
satisfy the large system assumption with ν (ρ) = 0.4. The number of frame is Nf = 10, thus leading
to a processing gain N = 1000 ≫ K. The line represents the theoretical values of (36) when using an
ARake, whereas the square markers correspond to the simulations achieved with the BRPC algorithm.
We can see that the simulations match closely with the theoretical results.
Fig. 4 shows the utility as a function of the channel gain when the processing gain N is constant, but
the ratio Nc/Nf is variable.7 The results have been obtained for a network with K = 16 users, L = 100
channel paths and processing gain N = 1000, using ARake receivers at the base station. The solid
line corresponds to Nc/Nf = 40, the dotted line represents Nc/Nf = 2.5, and the dashed line shows
Nc/Nf = 0.1. As expected, higher Nc/Nf ratios (and thus higher Nc, when N is fixed) correspond to
higher utility, as described in (36). In fact, ν (ρ) decreases as ρ increases, i.e., as Nc increases (when
L is fixed). This result complies with theoretical analysis of UWB systems [16], since, for a fixed total
processing gain N , increasing the number of chips per frame, Nc, will decrease the effects of SI, while
the dependency of the expressions on the MAI remains unchanged. Hence, a system with a higher Nc
achieves better performance.
Fig. 5 shows the probability Po = Pr{maxk pk = p = 1µW} of having at least one user transmitting
7To avoid a too busy graph, only the theoretical values are reported.
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Fig. 3. Achieved utility versus channel gain at the Nash equilibrium for the ARake receiver.
at the maximum power, as a function of the number of frames Nf . We consider 10 000 realizations of
the channel gains, using a network with ARake receivers at the base station, K = 32 users, Nc = 50,
and L = 100 (thus ρ = 0.5 and ν (ρ) ≃ 1.17). From (37), the minimum value of Nf that allows all K
users to achieve the optimum SINRs is Nf = ⌈8.33⌉ = 9. The simulations thus agree with the analytical
results of Sect. IV.
We now analyze the performance of the system when using a Pareto-optimal solution instead of the
Nash equilibrium. Fig. 6 shows the normalized utility uk/hk as a function of the load factor ρ. We
consider a network with K = 5 users, Nf = 20 frames and ARake receivers at the base station.
The lines represent theoretical values of Nash equilibrium (dotted line), using (36), and of the social
optimum solution (solid line), using (36) again, but substituting γ∗ with the numerical solution of (42),
γopt. The markers correspond to the simulation results. In particular, the circles represent the averaged
solution of the BRPC algorithm, while the square markers show averaged numerical results (through a
complete search) of the maximization (38), with ξk = 1. As stated in Sect. V, the difference between
the noncooperative approach and the Pareto-optimal solution is not significant. Fig. 7 compares the
target SINRs of the noncooperative solutions with the target SINRs of the Pareto-optimal solutions. As
before, the lines correspond to the theoretical values (dashed line for the noncooperative solution, solid
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Fig. 4. Achieved utility versus channel gain at the Nash equilibrium for different ratios Nc/Nf .
line for the social optimum solution), while the markers represent the simulation results (circles for the
noncooperative solutions, square markers for the Pareto-optimal solution). It is seen that, in both cases,
the averaged target SINRs for the Nash equilibrium, γ, and the averaged target SINRs for the social
optimum solution, γopt, are very close to γ∗, as shown in Sect. V.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have used a game-theoretic approach to study power control for a wireless data
network in frequency-selective environments, where the user terminals transmit IR-UWB signals and
the common concentration point employs Rake receivers. A noncooperative game has been proposed
in which users are allowed to choose their transmit powers according to a utility-maximizing criterion,
where the utility function has been defined as the ratio of the overall throughput to the transmit power.
For this utility function, we have shown that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the proposed
game, but, due to the frequency selective multipath, this equilibrium is achieved at a different output
SINR for each user, depending on the channel realization and the kind of Rake receiver used. Resorting
to a large system analysis, we have obtained a general characterization for the terms due to multiple
access interference and self-interference, suitable for any kind of channel model and for different types
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Fig. 5. Probability of having at least one user transmitting at maximum power versus number of frames.
of Rake receiver. Furthermore, explicit expressions for the utilities achieved at the equilibrium have been
derived for the case of an ARake receiver. It has also been shown that, under these hypotheses, the
noncooperative solution leads to a nearly SINR-balancing scenario. In order to evaluate the efficiency of
the Nash equilibrium, we have studied an optimum cooperative solution for the case of ARake receivers,
where the network seeks to maximize the sum of the users’ utilities. It has been shown that the difference
in performance between Nash and cooperative solutions is not significant for typical values of network
parameters.
APPENDIX I
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The following results are obtained from [5], [25]–[27].
A Nash equilibrium exists in the noncooperative game G = [K, {Pk}, {uk(p)}] if, for all k = 1, . . . ,K:
1) Pk is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of some Euclidean space RK ; and
2) uk(p) is continuous in p and quasi-concave in pk.
Each user has a strategy space that is defined by a minimum power p
k
and a maximum power pk,
and all power values in between. We also assume that pk ≥ pk. Thus, the first condition is satisfied.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of the normalized utility versus load factor for the noncooperative and Pareto-optimal solutions.
Moreover, since pk ≥ 0, it is apparent from (3) and (5) that uk(p) is continuous in p. To show that the
utility function uk(p) is quasi-concave in pk for all k in the NPCG, it is sufficient to prove that the local
maximum of uk(p) is at the same time a global maximum [28], [29].
For a differentiable function, the first-order necessary optimality condition is given by ∂uk(p)/∂pk = 0.
Recalling (3) and (5), the partial derivative of uk(p) with respect to pk is
∂uk(p)
∂pk
=
DR
Mp2k
(
f ′(γk)γk (1− γk/γ0,k)− f(γk)
)
, (47)
where γ0,k is defined as in (15) and f ′(γk) = df(γk)/dγk . For the sake of simplicity, we do not explicitly
show the dependence of γk on pk. Since pk ≥ 0 for the NPCG, we examine only positive real numbers.
Evaluating (47) at pk = 0, we get ∂uk(pk,p−k)/∂pk = 0. Therefore, pk = 0 is a stationary point and
the value of utility at this point is uk(p) = 0. If we evaluate utility in the ε-neighborhood of pk = 0,
where ε is a small positive number, we notice that utility is positive, which implies utility is increasing
at pk = 0. Hence, pk = 0 cannot be a local maximum. For nonzero values of the transmit power, we
examine the values of γ∗k = γk(p∗k) such that ∂uk(pk,p−k)/∂pk|pk=p∗k = 0, thus satisfying the first-order
necessary optimality condition. In other words, we evaluate γ∗k such that
γ∗k (1− γ
∗
k/γ0,k) = f(γ
∗
k)/f
′(γ∗k), (48)
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the target SINRs versus load factor for the noncooperative and Pareto-optimal solutions.
as shown in (14).
We observe that the left-hand side of the above equation is a concave parabola with its vertex in γk =
γ0,k/2 > 0, and d (γk (1− γk/γ0,k)) /dγk|γk=0 = 1. The right-hand side is an increasing function, with
d (f(γk)/f
′(γk)) /dγk|γk=0 = 1/i′ < 1 when f ′(0) = 0, where i′ = min{i ∈ N : dif(γk)/dγik|γk=0 6= 0}.
Furthermore, the equation is satisfied at γk = 0. Therefore, there is a single value γ∗k that satisfies (14)
for γk > 0. The second-order partial derivative of the utility with respect to the power reveals that this
point is a local maximum and therefore a global maximum. Hence, the utility function of user k is
quasi-concave in pk for all k. The same conclusion applies also if p∗k > pk for some k, even though
γ∗k cannot be achieved. In fact, by applying the previous considerations to (47), it is easy to verify that
uk(pk,p−k) is strictly increasing in γk ∈ [0, γk(p∗k) = γ∗k), which in turn, from (5), is strictly increasing
in pk ∈ [0, p∗k). Since pk ∈ [pk, pk], which is a subset of [0, p
∗
k), uk(pk = pk,p−k) represents both the
local and the global maximum of the utility function. 
Lemma 1: The solution γ∗k of (14) satisfies the condition
0 ≤ γ∗k < γ0,k. (49)
Proof: As f(γ∗k) is an increasing function of γ∗k , f ′(γ∗k) ≥ 0 for every γ∗k . Since the existence
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of the solution is ensured by Theorem 1 and γ∗k and f(γ∗k) are both greater than zero, the condition
(1− γ∗k/γ0,k) > 0 must hold.
B. Proof of Prop. 1
Using Theorem 1, for a given interference, the SINR γ∗k corresponds to the transmit power p∗k as in
(18). Since γ∗k is the unique maximizer of the utility, the correspondence between the transmit power
and the SINR must be studied. As can be verified, (18) represents the equation of a hyperbola passing
through the origin, with the asymptotes parallel to the Cartesian axes. In particular, the vertical asymptote
is γ∗k = γ0,k. Therefore, using Lemma 1 presented in App. I-A, there exists a one-to-one correspondence
between the transmit power, p∗k ∈ [0,+∞), and the SINR, γ∗k ∈ [0, γ0,k). Thus, the transmit power p∗k
is also unique. If p∗k /∈ Pk for some user k, since it is not a feasible point, then p∗k cannot be the best
response to a given p−k. In this case, we observe that ∂uk(p)/∂pk ≤ 0 for any γk ≤ γ∗k , and hence
for any pk ≤ p∗k. This implies that the utility function is increasing in that region. Since p is the largest
power in the strategy space, it yields the highest utility among all pk ≤ p and thus is the best response
to p−k. 
C. Proof of Theorem 2
By Theorem 1, we know that there exists an equilibrium in the NPCG. Let p denote the Nash
equilibrium in the NPCG. By definition, the Nash equilibrium must satisfy p = r(p), where r(p) =
[r1(p), . . . , rK(p)]. The fixed point p = r(p) is unique if the correspondence r(p) is a standard function
[30], i.e., if it satisfies the following properties:
1) positivity: r(p) > 0;
2) monotonicity: if p > p′, then r(p) > r(p′);
3) scalability: for all µ > 1, µr(p) > r(µp).
It is apparent that rk(p) = rk(p−k). Taking into account (17) and (18), the first condition translates into
p∗k > 0 for all k ∈ K. Using (5), (8) and (49), the proof is straightforward. Recalling (17) and (18),
the second and the third condition are also apparent, since p−k modifies only the numerator of (18).
Therefore, since r(p) is a standard function, the Nash equilibrium of the NPCG is unique. 
D. Proof of Prop. 2
Based on Prop. 1, when all users reach the Nash equilibrium, their transmit powers are
p∗k =
γ∗k
(∑
j 6=k h
(MAI)
kj p
∗
j + σ
2
)
h
(SP)
k
(
1− γ∗k/γ0,k
) . (50)
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Using Ass. 1 in (50), it is straightforward to obtain:
q ·
[
1− γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)]
= σ2γ∗k > 0, (51)
which implies γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
)
< 1, proving necessity. It is also straightforward to show that, if each
terminal k uses transmit power p∗k as in (23), all terminals will achieve the SINR requirement, finishing
the proof of sufficiency. Finally, consider any other joint distribution of powers and channel realizations,
and let q′ = infk∈K
{
h
(SP)
k p
∗
k
}
. Then, by exactly the same argument as was used in the proof of necessity,
q′ ≥
σ2γ∗k
1− γ∗k ·
(
γ−10,k + ζ
−1
k
) = q. (52)
This means that assigning powers according to (23) does indeed give the minimal power solution. 
APPENDIX II
In order to prove Theorems 3 and 4, it is worth introducing the following results.
Lemma 2: [31] Consider an n-dimensional vector rn = [R1, . . . , Rn] with independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) standardized (complex) entries (i.e. E[Ri] = 0 and E[|Ri|2] = 1, with E[·] denoting
expectation), and let Cn be an n× n (complex) matrix independent of rn. For any integer p,
E[|rHn Cnrn − Tr(Cn)|
p] = Kp((E[|R1|
4] Tr(CnC
H
n ))
p/2
+ E[|R1|
2p] Tr(CnC
H
n )
p/2), (53)
where the constant Kp does not depend either on n or on Cn.
Theorem 5: Consider an n-dimensional vector xn = 1√n [X1, . . . ,Xn] with i.i.d. standardized (com-
plex) entries with finite eighth moment, and let Cn be an n × n (complex) matrix independent of xn
with uniformly bounded spectral radius for all n. Under these hypotheses,
xHn Cnxn
a.s.
→ 1n Tr(Cn). (54)
Proof: Using Lemma 2 and Markov’s inequality,
Pr[|xHn Cnxn−
1
nTr(Cn)| > ǫ] ≤
E[|xHn Cnxn−
1
nTr(Cn)|
4]
ǫ4
≤ κ ·
1
n2 · ǫ4
, (55)
where κ <∞ is a constant value independent of n. Thus,
∞∑
n=1
Pr[|xHn Cnxn − Tr(Cn)|
4 > ǫ] <∞. (56)
Using the Borel-Cantelli lemma [32], the result (54) is straightforward.
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Theorem 6: Suppose xn = [X1, . . . ,Xn] and yn = [Y1, . . . , Yn] are n-dimensional independent vectors
with i.i.d. standardized (complex) entries with finite eighth moment, and Cn is an n×n matrix (complex)
independent on xn and yn with uniformly bounded spectral radius for all n. Then,
xHn Cnyn
a.s.
→ 0. (57)
Proof: The proof can be obtained using the same steps as that of Theorem 5.
A. Proof of Theorem 3
To prove that Nζ−1k converges a.s. to non-random limits, we focus on the ratio
N
h
(MAI)
kj
h
(SP)
j
=
∣∣∣∣BHk ·αj∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣AHj · βk∣∣∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣βHk · αj∣∣2(
βHk ·αk
)
·
(
βHj ·αj
)
=
1
L2
[∣∣∣∣BHk · αj∣∣∣∣2+∣∣∣∣∣∣AHj · βk∣∣∣∣∣∣2+∣∣βHk · αj∣∣2
]
1
L
(
βHk ·αk
)
· 1L
(
βHj · αj
) . (58)
It is sufficient to show that both numerator and denominator of (58) converge a.s. to a non-random limit.
Let
w(k) = (Dαk )
−1
αk (59)
and
βk = Gαk
= (G ◦Dαk )w
(k)
= Dβkw
(k), (60)
where Dαk and D
β
k are defined as in (24) and (25), respectively; the operator ◦ denotes the Hadamard
(element-wise) product; and the matrix G is dependent on the type of Rake receiver employed. Using
(59) and (60), by Theorem 5, we obtain
1
L2
∣∣∣∣BHk · αj∣∣∣∣2 a.s.→ ϕ
(
1
L
DαjBkB
H
k D
α
j
)
= lim
L→∞
1
L2
L∑
i=1
{Dαj }
2
i
L∑
l=i+1
(β
(k)
l )
2
= lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
l=1
(β
(k)
l+1)
2
l∑
m=1
{Dαj }
2
m
= lim
L→∞
1
L
L−1∑
l=1
χl, (61)
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where ϕ (·) is defined as in (28) and
χl =
1
L
(β
(k)
l+1)
2
l∑
m=1
{Dαj }
2
m (62)
are independent random variables, with
E [χl] =
1
L
{Dβk}
2
l+1
l∑
m=1
{Dαj }
2
m (63)
and
Var [χl] =
1
L2
Var[(β
(k)
l+1)
2]
(
l∑
m=1
{Dαj }
2
m
)2
≤ Var[(β
(k)
l+1)
2] ·
(
Tr((Dαj )
2)
L
)2
<∞. (64)
Using the weak version of the law of large numbers for non-i.i.d. random variables,
1
L
L−1∑
l=1
χl
a.s.
→ lim
L→∞
1
L
L−1∑
l=1
E[χl]
= lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−1∑
l=1
{Dβk}
2
l+1
l∑
m=1
{Dαj }
2
m
= ϕ
(
DαjC
β
kC
β
k
H
Dαj
)
, (65)
where Cαk and C
β
k are defined as in (26) and (27), respectively. Similar arguments yield
1
L2
∣∣∣∣AHj · βk∣∣∣∣2 a.s.→ ϕ(DβkCαjCαj HDβk) . (66)
Then applying Theorem 6, from (60) we obtain
1
L
βHk · αj
a.s.
→ 0, (67)
since βk is independent of αj . Analogously, using Theorem 5, from (59) we obtain
1
L
βHk · αk
a.s.
→ ϕ
(
DαkD
β
k
)
. (68)
Using (65) – (68), the result (29) is straightforward. 
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B. Proof of Theorem 4
In order to prove that N/γ0,k converges a.s. to a non-random limit, it is sufficient to show that both
the numerator and the denominator converge to non-random limits. Note that
∣∣∣∣Φ · (BHk · αk +AHk · βk)∣∣∣∣2 =
=
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
(
i∑
l=1
α
(k)
l β
(k)
L+l−i +
i∑
l=1
β
(k)
l α
(k)
L+l−i
)2
=
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
(
i∑
l=1
θk (l, L+ l − i) ·w
(k)
l ·w
(k)
L+l−i
)2
,
(69)
where θk (l, L+ l − i) is defined as in (31).
Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 3, after some algebraic manipulation, it can be
proven that
1
L2
∣∣∣∣Φ · (BHk ·αk +AHk · βk)∣∣∣∣2 a.s.→
lim
L→∞
L−1∑
i=1
φ2i ·
i∑
l=1
θ2k (l, L+ l − i)
L2
. (70)
Using (70), in conjunction with (68), the result (30) is straightforward. 
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